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A Rose by Any Other Name:
The Chilling Effect of ICE's
"Secure" Communities Program
STEPHANIE KANG*

Introduction
Since the September 11, 2001, attack on United States soil, both
the federal government and its citizens have felt a renewed urgency
to police United States borders and push undocumented immigrants
out of the country in the name of national security. For example, a
recent study conducted in February 2011 found that 35% of survey
respondents say that the priority in dealing with illegal immigration
should be tightening border security and more strictly enforcing
immigration laws.' Since 2001, Congress has passed numerous
appropriations bills to implement immigration enforcement
measures, while resoundingly striking down immigrant-friendly
acts. 2
* University of California Hastings College of the Law, Juris Doctor Candidate, May
2012; University of Southern California, B.A. in Political Science with a minor in
Psychology, B.S. in Business Administration with a concentration in Management
Consulting, May 2007. Thank you to Robert Uy and Marrianne Sioson for inspiring me
to write about this topic, and special thanks to Eva Choi, Diana Lin, and Marion Mou for
your unfaltering support.
1. Public Favors Tougher Border Controls and Path to Citizenship, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (Feb. 24, 2011), http:/ /pewresearch.org/pubs/1904/poll-illegal-immigrationborder-security-path-to-citizenship--birthright-citizenship-arizona-law.
2. For example, the Development, Relief and Education of Alien Minors ("DREAM")
Act first introduced on August 1, 2001, would have provided conditional permanent
residency to undocumented students who were brought to the Unites States as minors,
graduated from a U.S. high school, and subject to other conditions - such as military
service or completing higher education at a four-year institution. S. 1291, 107th Cong.
(2001). After failing to proceed past the Senate in 2001, the DREAM Act was reintroduced on March 26, 2009. S. 729, 111th Cong. (2009). An amended version of the
DREAM Act was considered throughout 2010, but disappointingly, a Senate filibuster
blocked the passage of the DREAM Act on December 18, 2010. S. 3992, 111th Cong.
(2010). See also Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2006)
(would have allowed undocumented immigrants present in the United States for a long
[83]
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One of the more controversial state and federal collaborative
efforts to enforce immigration laws is the Secure Communities
program; the program mandates all participating jurisdictions to
submit fingerprint biometrics to Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement ("ICE"), enabling ICE to run the fingerprints through
their own immigration database and identify deportable
immigrants.3 Although ICE stated that the primary goal of the
program is to remove the most dangerous criminals from local
An
communities, the data illustrates a divergent result.
overwhelming majority of individuals that ICE has deported under
the Secure Communities program are identified as noncriminals or
individuals who committed only minor infractions or petty
offenses.4 Moreover, there is a growing concern surrounding
potential and existing due process and civil rights violations namely, racial profiling at the forefront of those concerns.5 Finally,
local and state authorities do not have an option to opt out from the
program, and this raises concerns that the Secure Communities
program may be in violation of the Tenth Amendment's
anti-commandeering rule.
Part I of this note will discuss the federal authority to enforce
immigration law and the evolution of federal enforcement policy to
include more extensive cooperation with state and local law
enforcement agencies. This note will provide background on ICE's
umbrella initiative, ICE Agreements of Cooperation in Communities
to Enhance Safety & Security ("ACCESS"), with a focus on three
programs in particular: 2 8 7(g) Agreements, the Criminal Alien
Program, and Secure Communities. Part II of this note will provide
an in-depth analysis of the Secure Communities program and its
purported goals and priorities. Part III of this note will examine the
period of time to obtain legal status, introduced a new visa program for guest workers,
and increased border enforcement along the United States-Mexico border). But cf
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-61, 121 Stat. 1844 (provided $200
million to the Department of Homeland Security to increase and improve immigration
enforcement).
3. Secure Communities - The Secure Communities Process, U.S. IMMIGRATION &
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/secure-communities/ (last visited Oct.
26, 2011).
4. See U.S. IMMIGRATION

AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECURE COMMUNITIES:

IDENT/IAFIS INTEROPERABILITY MONTHLY STATISTICS THROUGH APRIL 30,2011, 2 (2011),

available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/ sc-stats/ nationwideinteroperability-stats
-fy2011-feb28.pdf (data shows that cumulatively, from October 2008 to April 2011,
approximately 60% of immigrants deported were low-level offenders or noncriminal
immigration violators).
5. NAT'L IMMIGRATION

FORUM, SECURE COMMUNITIES

1

(2009),

available at

http://www.inmigrationforum.org/images/uploads/Secure-Communities.pdf.
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significant legal and social consequences of implementing Secure
Communities, including potential Tenth Amendment violations and
allegations of due process and civil rights violations. Finally, Part IV
of this note will propose solutions to the existing problems inherent
in the Secure Communities program.

I. Authority to Enforce Immigration Laws and

Current Enforcement Programs
Under the United States Constitution, it is within the sole
purview of Congress to regulate immigration by promulgating laws
and establishing enforcement policies. 6 Acting within its powers,
Congress has enacted numerous pieces of immigration legislation,
with one of the most seminal and comprehensive being the
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA").7 The INA dictates federal
immigration law and sets forth the "rules for legal immigration,
naturalization, deportation, and enforcement" in the United States.8
Pursuant to section 287 of the INA,9 any officer or employee of
the Immigration and Nationality Service ("INS"), now the
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), has the authority to
enforce immigration laws in conformity with Attorney General's
Effective March 1, 2003, Congress passed the
regulations.1o
Homeland Security Act of 2002, which reorganized and reformed the
immigration agency by eliminating the INS and establishing the new
DHS.11 The majority of the INS's functions were transferred to
newly-formed agencies within DHS. 12 DHS is currently comprised
of seven agencies, amongst which the immigration services and
enforcement functions are divided within three agencies: ICE, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), and U.S. Customs
and Border Protection ("CPB").13
6. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
7. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1107, 1151-1381, 1401-1504,
1521-1525, 1531-1537 (2011).
8. LISA M. SEGHETTI ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32270, ENFORCING
IMMIGRATION LAW: THE ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 3 (2009).

9. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2006).
10. See id., for a list of the specific and limited powers of immigration officers and
employees.
11. Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §§ 111-113 (2002); see also ALISON
SISKIN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33351, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT WITHIN THE
UNITED STATES 4 n.11 (2006).

12. SISKIN, supra note 11, at 4 n.11.
13. ICE ACCESS,

U.S.

IMMIGR.

gov/access/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).

& CUSTOMS

ENFORCEMENT,

http://www.ice.
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As set out by the U.S. Constitution and the INA, the federal
government is the branch that traditionally enforces immigration
laws. However, after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the U.S.,
there has been an expansion of immigration enforcement efforts in
the last ten years, particularly in ICE's use of state and local law
enforcement to further these efforts. 14 In 1996, Congress granted
state and local law enforcement the authority to enforce federal
imniigration law. 15 Since then, there has been much confusion
surrounding state and local law enforcement's role in immigration
enforcement. In particular, there is confusion as to whether local
and state law enforcement agencies have the authority to enforce
only criminal violations of the INA or civil violations as well.1 6
Currently, under ICE ACCESS there are several programs that
involve state and local law enforcement cooperation with the federal
government, and the three most well-known programs are
Immigration Cross-Designation - 287(g) (287(g) Agreements),
Criminal Alien Program (CAP), and Secure Communities.17
A. ICE ACCESS Initiative
According to DHS, the ICE ACCESS initiative was developed in
response to widespread interest from state and local law
enforcement agencies in combating specific challenges in their
communities.18 Accordingly, when ICE implemented the ACCESS
initiative, it was designed to promote the programs that ICE offers to
assist state and local law enforcement agencies with such
challenges.19
i. Section 287(g) Agreements
The most well-known program under the ACCESS initiative is
program, which Congress established through the Illegal
the
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 that
amended the INA by adding Section 287(g). 20 Section 2 87(g)
2 8 7 (g)

14. Jennifer M. Chacon, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the
Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1579, 1581 (2010).
15. Id. at 1580.
16. Id. at 1580-81.
17. Id. at 1582, 1592.
18. Fact Sheet: ICE Agreements of Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety and
Security (ACCESS), U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/
news/library/factsheets/access.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
19. ICE ACCESS, supra note 13.
20. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2006).
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expressly allows, but does not compel, state officers and employees
designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security to perform the
enforcement functions of an immigration officer. 21 To institute
partnerships, the Secretary of Homeland Security enters into
voluntary joint agreements with state and local law enforcement
agencies under a Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA"); this allows
designated officers to perform immigration law enforcement
functions. 22 These agreements are commonly referred to as 2 8 7(g)
agreements and require that state or local law enforcement officers
who will perform such functions receive training on federal
immigration law and be certified as having received such "adequate
training." 23 ICE offers a four week training program with certified
instructors teaching the program. 24
As of September 2011, ICE has signed MOAs with sixty-nine
law enforcement agencies in twenty-four states and has trained over
1,500 officers to enforce federal immigration law. 25 According to
ICE's fact sheet, since January 2006, these 287(g) agreements have
resulted in the identification of over 217,300 potentially removable
undocumented immigrants - most of whom are already in jail. 2 6
Despite these seemingly impressive numbers, communities are
voicing legitimate concerns of rampant due process and civil rights
violations, especially racial profiling. 27 Critics of 287(g) agreements
believe that these agreements enable law enforcement officers to use
racial profiling as a means of targeting immigrant populations. 28
Critics contend that police officers arrest perceived immigrants for
alleged criminal activity merely as a pretext to initiate removal
proceedings. 29 Moreover, a report published by the Government
Accountability Office in January of 2009, concluded that ICE had left
the 2 87(g) program objectives ambiguous and had not provided
information to the public on how local law enforcement officers

21. Id.
22. Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and
Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMs ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/news/
library/factsheets/287g.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
23. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA & KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL41423,
AUTHORITY OF STATE AND LOCAL POLICE TO ENFORCE FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW 4

(2010).
24. Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and
Nationality Act, supra note 22.
25. Id.

26. Id.
27. NAT'L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 5.

28. Chacon, supra note 14, at 1584-85.
29. Id.
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were using their privileges.3 0
In response, DHS conducted an audit of the 287(g) agreements
and substantially reformed the program; for example, DHS revised
the MOAs to clarify the scope of powers authorized to the state and
local law enforcement agencies and added significantly more
oversight provisions to the program. 31 Additionally, ICE has
explicitly stated that racial profiling will not be tolerated and any
claims of profiling will be fully investigated. 32 In fact, if proof of
racial profiling is established, individual officers or even entire
departments could potentially have their 287(g) agreements
revoked.3 3
Still, civil rights organizations are dubious as to the effectiveness
of the reformed 2 8 7 (g) program and argue that ICE's revisions are
minor and unlikely to address concerns of racial-profiling. 34 There is
no concrete evidence to confirm or dispel these fears, but despite its
flaws, the 2 87 (g) agreements stand apart from the other ICE ACCESS
programs because they are transparent; partnerships are
consummated with publicly-available written documents, are
limited in scope, and contain specific complaint procedures for
reporting abuses of power.35
ii. Criminal Alien Program
Unlike the 2 8 7(g) program, CAP does not involve granting state
or local law enforcement the power to enforce immigration laws.
CAP focuses on cooperation between state and federal agencies in
identifying, processing, and removing criminal undocumented
immigrants incarcerated in prisons and jails throughout the U.S.36
The program's objective is to "[prevent the] release [of criminal
aliens] into the general public by securing a final order of removal
prior to the termination of their sentences."3 7
CAP begins with ICE assigning agents to different federal, state,
30. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-109, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT:
BETTER CONTROLS NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND LOCAL
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS 4-6 (2009).

31. Fact Sheet: Updated Facts on ICE's 287(g) Program, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
(last
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g-reform.htm
visited Aug. 19, 2011).
32. Fact Sheet: Updated Facts on ICE's 287(g) Program, supra note 31.
33. Id.
34. Chacon, supra note 14, at 1585 n.108.
35. Id. at 1585-86.
36. Fact Sheet: Criminal Alien Program, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/cap.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
37. Id.

Winter 2012]

A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME

89

and local prisons or jails who will be responsible for identifying
criminal noncitizens who have already been arrested, but not
necessarily convicted. 38 After an ICE agent has identified such a
person, the agent is authorized to issue a detainer against the noncitizen. 39 A detainer is a DHS request that another law enforcement
agency contact ICE before releasing an undocumented immigrant, so
that ICE may make arrangements to assume custody of the
immigrant for deportation. 40
Much like the Secure Communities initiative, CAP is often
criticized because individuals are screened by ICE for immigration
status upon arrest, not upon conviction.41 The concern is that local
and state law enforcement may be racially profiling individuals by
seeking out persons of a certain race or ethnic group who appear to
be unlawfully present and arresting them for petty offenses. 42
Indeed, the University of California, Berkeley conducted a study on
the CAP program in Irving, Texas, and found "strong evidence to
support claims that Irving police engaged in racial profiling of
Hispanics in order to filter them through the CAP screening
system." 43 Specifically, the study found that within twenty-four
hours after CAP was implemented, discretionary arrests of
Hispanics for minor offenses -

such as traffic offenses -

rose

dramatically. 44

Local police arrested Hispanics for misdemeanor
offenses at a higher rate than Caucasians or African Americans. 45
While this study was geographically limited to one city in Texas, an
inference can be made that the same potential for abuse of power
exists in the Secure Communities program. After all, CAP and
Secure Communities are similar initiatives in that they appear to be
facially neutral programs, but both hold the potential for police
abuse of discretion via racially profiling perceived immigrants.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Chacon, supra note 14, at 1592.
Id. See also Fact Sheet: Updated Facts on ICE's 287(g) Program,supra note 36.
8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a).
Chacon, supra note 14, at 1592.
Id. at 1593.

43. TREVOR GARDNER II & AARTI KOHLI, THE C.A.P. EFFECT: RACIAL PROFILING IN
THE ICE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM 1 (2009), available at http://www.aw.berkeley.edu/

files/policybrief -irvingFINAL.pdf.
44. Id. at 1-2.
45. Id.
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II. Summary of the Secure Communities Program
This note focuses on the Secure Communities program, which
has been seen as an extension or expansion of CAP. Under Secure
Communities, participating jails and prisons submit arrestees'
fingerprints to both criminal and immigration databases, essentially
enabling ICE to have a technological presence, whereas, under CAP,
ICE only has a physical presence within penitentiaries. 46
Additionally, unlike the 2 8 7 (g) agreements, Secure Communities
does not give local and state law enforcement the power to enforce
immigration law.4 7
A. Goals of Secure Communities
On December 26, 2007, President George W. Bush signed the
fiscal year 2008 DHS appropriations bill into law. 4 8 In this bill,
Congress provided ICE approximately $200 million to "improve and
modernize efforts to identify aliens convicted of a crime, sentenced
to imprisonment, and who may be deportable, and remove them
from the United States once they are judged deportable." 49 Pursuant
to Congress' directive, ICE implemented Secure Communities in
March 2008, with three primary objectives:
Identify aliens in federal, state and local custody charged with or
convicted of a serious criminal offense who are subject to removal
and those aliens who have prior convictions for serious criminal
offenses and are subject to removal who are currently at large;
Prioritizeenforcement actions to ensure apprehension and removal
of aliens convicted of serious criminal offenses; and,
Transform criminal alien enforcement processes and systems to
achieve lasting results.50
As of September 27, 2011, Secure Communities has been

46. MICHELE WASLIN, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, SPECIAL REPORT: THE
SECURE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND CONTINUING CONCERNS

3 (2010), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/
Secure_ Communities-updated_110410.pdf.
47. Id.
48. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat 1844.
49. Id.
50. Secure Communities Fact Sheet, SCRIBD (September 1, 2009) (emphasis added),
http://www.scribd.com/doc/24689591/ICE-Fact-Sheet-Secure-Communities-9-1-09 (no
longer available on ICE website).
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activated 5 ' in 1,595 jurisdictions in forty-four states and territories. 52
ICE expects Secure Communities to be fully implemented and
operational in all states by 2013.53
i. Identify Aliens in Custody Chargedwith a Serious Criminal
Offense
Before Secure Communities, most state and local law
enforcement officers submitted an arrestee's fingerprints through a
booking process that automatically compared that fingerprint with
fingerprints in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's ("FBI")
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System ("IAFIS").54
Now, in jurisdictions where Secure Communities has been activated,
arrestees' fingerprints are also checked against the U.S. Visitor and
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program and the Automated
Biometric Identification System ("IDENT").55 This fingerprint check
automatically and immediately searches the three databases for an
individual's criminal and immigration history. 56 The local law
enforcement and FBI relationship stays the same, and the results of
the FBI IAFIS fingerprint check will be provided to the local law
enforcement agency as it normally would.57
However, if there is a match in the immigration databases, the
system will automatically notify ICE even if the individual is not
ultimately charged with a criminal offense or charges are eventually
dismissed.58 Once ICE is notified, it makes an "immigration status
determination" on the individual and sends that to the FBI, who
59
then passes it along to the local law enforcement agency.
51. The Secure Communities website contains no clear definition of what it means to
be "activated" and does not specify how a jurisdiction becomes activated. However, it
seems safe to assume that "activated" can be used interchangeably with "implemented."
52 U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECURE COMMUNITIES:
ACTIVATED JURISDICTIONS 1 (2010), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-

communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf.
53. SECURE COMMUNITIES: ACTIVATED JURISDICTIONS, supra 52 (as of September 27,

2011, seventeen states and territories are 100% activated in every jurisdiction within the
state: Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Michigan, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Puerto Rico).
54. IMMIGRATION

OPERATING

& CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECURE COMMUNITIES STANDARD

PROCEDURES

3-4 (2009),

available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/

securecommunities/ securecommunitiesops93009.pdf
55. Id.
56.
57.
58.
59.

WASLIN, supra note 46, at 7.
SECURE COMMUNITIES STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 54, at 4.
WASLIN, supra note 46, at 7.
SECURE COMMUNITIES STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 54, at 4.
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ii. PrioritizeRemoval of Aliens Convicted of Serious Criminal
Offenses
Secure Communities' second objective is to prioritize the removal
of undocumented immigrants who are convicted of serious criminal
offenses. To meet this objective, ICE conducts the appropriate
measures using a risk-based approach to determine whether the
criminal alien will be removed. 60 ICE has identified three priorities:
(1) aliens who pose a danger to national security or a risk to public
safety, (2) recent illegal entrants, and (3) aliens who are fugitives or
otherwise obstruct immigration controls.61 Priority one uses a riskbased approach that classifies convicted aliens into three levels:
Level 1: Aliens convicted of "aggravated felonies," as defined in
§101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, or two or
more crimes each punishable by more than one year, commonly
referred to as "felonies";
Level 2: Aliens convicted of any felony or three or more crimes
each punishable by less than one year, commonly referred to as
"misdemeanors"; and
Level 3: Aliens convicted of crimes punishable by less than one
year. 62
According to an ICE Memo directed at all ICE employees, Level 1
and Level 2 offenders should receive principal attention. 63
iii. Transform Criminal Alien Enforcement Processes and Systems
Through Secure Communities, ICE hopes to "optimize
capacity" and maximize efficiency in immigration enforcement by
using automated systems that "speed the removal of criminal aliens
from the United States, reducing the amount of time they spend in
ICE custody."64 ICE's plan for modernization includes using "video
teleconferencing to conduct interviews and immigration hearings,
[and using] computer technology to track the use of detention beds
and transportation systems." 65
60. Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec'y, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, to all ICE Employees 1 (June 30, 2010), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/civil enforcement priorities.pdf.
61. Id. at 1-2.
62. Id. at 2.
63. Id.
64. Secure Communities Fact Sheet, supra note 50.
65. Id.
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III. Problems with the Secure Communities Initiative
Secure Communities was purportedly developed to facilitate
the removal of some of the most dangerous alien criminals.
Although the Secure Communities program's overarching objective
appears promising, its implementation and lack of public
transparency has garnered fear amongst immigrant communities
and advocates of immigrant rights. 66 Recently released information
regarding the actual deportation results of Secure Communities
indicate that ICE has not acted in accordance with its purported
goals and priorities. 67 In fact, contrary to ICE's stated policy, the
majority of removals done through Secure Communities involve
low-level or noncriminal immigrants. 68
As a result of the program's flaws and ICE's lack of
transparency, a number of localities rejected its implementation and
attacked the program on legal and constitutional grounds. 69 Some
localities discussed the possibility of Secure Communities violating
the anti-commandeering clause of the Tenth Amendment, while
others are worried about rampant civil rights violations. Immigrant
rights groups fear that Secure Communities has become a tool to
promote discrimination and racial profiling and will discourage
undocumented victims of crimes from seeking police protection. 70
A. Lack of Transparency
Critics attack ICE and Secure Communities for the lack of
transparency in their operations. According to the Center for
Constitutional Rights, National Day Laborer Organization Network,
and the Kathryn 0. Greenberg Immigration Justice Clinic of the
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, "information about the nascent
program has been scarce, and the development of operational details

66. See e.g., Press Release, Center for Constitutional Rights, Rights Groups Release
Documents from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Agency FOIA
Lawsuit (Aug. 10, 2010), available at http://ccjustice.org/newsroom/pressreleases/ rights-groups-release-documents-u.s.-immigration-and-customs-enforcement%
28ice%29-agency-foia-lawsuit.
67. Id.

68. See SECURE COMMUNITIES: IDENT/IAFIS
STATISTICS THROUGH APRIL 30,2011, supra note 4, at 2.

INTEROPERABILITY

MONTHLY

69. ICE: Secure Communities Program Not Optional, HOMELAND SECURITY NEWSWIRE
(March 7, 2011), http://homelandsecuritynewswire.com/ice-secure-communitiesprogram-not-optional?page=0,0.
70. NATIONAL IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 5.
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These three organizations
has been shrouded in secrecy."7 1
information pertaining
ICE,
requesting
instituted a lawsuit against
to Secure Communities under the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA").72 Prior to the lawsuit, few documents were available to
the public, but since the filing of the suit ICE has released over
Twenty-five documents.73
B.

Contradictions Between Stated Goals and Actual Results

Although ICE specified that Secure Communities will primarily
focus on the most dangerous criminal aliens that are a serious threat
to communities, the most recent data does not support this
According to the most recently released Secure
statement.
Communities statistics, from October 2008 to September 2011 a
majority of deported immigrants were either noncriminals or Level 3
offenders (aliens convicted of crimes punishable by less than one
year).74 Out of a total number of 142,090 Secure Communities
removals, 37,271 (or 26.2%) of deported immigrants were
noncriminal and 44,388 (or 31.2%) were Level 3 offenders.7 5 This
means that roughly 60% of the undocumented immigrants that ICE
removed through Secure Communities are labeled as low-priority
under the professed goals of the program, a fact that ICE has
conceded.
These same proportions are reflected in individual state
numbers. California, which has the largest number of fingerprint
submissions and removals, had a cumulative total of 55,233
removals since its activation in 2009, with 29,319 (approximately
53%) of these removals being of individuals identified as
noncriminals or Level 3 offenders. 76 Texas, the second largest in
fingerprint submissions and removals, had 18,671 (approximately
56%) noncriminal or Level 3 offenders removed of a total of 33,447
71. Center for Constitutional Rights, supra note 66.
72. See Center for Constitutional Rights, supra note 66. See also Nat'1 Day Laborer Org.
Network v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Agency, 10 CIV. 3488 SAS, 2011 WL
381625 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2011); Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2009).
73. See FOIA Library - Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,

http://www.ice.gov/foia/library/index.htm (last visited, Aug. 19, 2011).
74. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECURE COMMUNITIES:
IDENT/IAFIS INTEROPERABILITY MONTHLY STATISTICS THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2011 2

(2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc-stats/nationwide-interoper
ability-stats-fy2011-to-date.pdf (since its inception, 57% of immigrants deported under
Secure Communities are Level 3 or noncriminal offenders).
75. Id.

76. Id. at 5.
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individuals." In fact, in Texas, there are more Level 3 offenders
removed (12,650) than Level 1 (8,597) or Level 2 (6,179) offenders.78
This data is troubling and shows a direct contradiction between
Secure Communities' stated goals and its actual implementation. If
nationwide 59% of ICE removals under Secure Communities are
low-priority or noncriminals, ICE is hardly meeting its purported
goal of eliminating the most dangerous criminals in local
communities. Moreover, ICE is not meeting Congress' mandate for
ICE to dedicate at least $1.5 billion "to identify aliens convicted of a
crime who may be deportable ... [and to] prioritize the identification
and removal of aliens convicted of a crime by the severity of that crime." 79
C.

Constitutional Concerns

Given the misgivings spawned from the Secure Communities
program, many states and localities are left wondering whether they
have the option to refuse to implement the program. Several
immigrant rights groups and localities asked ICE for clarification,
and DHS officials gave conflicting responses as to whether states or
localities may opt out of the program.8 0 At first, in September 2010,
ICE released a publication outlining the procedures that jurisdictions
who wanted to opt out should follow, indicating that Secure
Communities was optional.81 Then, in November 2010, the David
Venturella, then Director of ICE, stated at a press conference that
ICE's position was that localities would not be able to opt out of
Secure Communities. 82 A year later, in August 2011, John Morton,
new Director of ICE, informed state governors that MOAs would no
longer be required to activate or operate Secure Communities,
essentially confirming that the program is mandatory.8 3 At the time
77. SECURE COMMUNITIES: IDENT/IAFIS INTEROPERABILITY MONTHLY STATISTICS

THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2011, supra note 74, at 6.

78. Id.
SECURE COMMUNITIES:
ENFORCEMENT,
79. U.S.
IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS
QUARTERLY REPORT - FISCAL YEAR 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS FOURTH QUARTER ii (2011)

(emphasis added).
80. Advocates Ask ICE: Why No Opt-Out of Secure Communities?, DEPORTATION
NATION (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.deportationnation.org/2010/11/video-advocatesask-why-no-opt-out-of-secure-communities/.
81. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECURE COMMUNITIES: SETTING

THE RECORD STRAIGHT 6 (2010), available at http://www.aila.org/content/default.

aspx?bc=26286 133041.
82. DEPORTATION NATION, supra note 80.

83. Elise Foley, Secure Communities Agreements Canceled, Participation Still Required,
THE Huffington Post (Aug. 8, 2011, 07:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/
08/05/secure-communities-update-department-of-homelandsecurity n _919651.html.
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of publication, Secure Communities does not appear to have an opt
out option, which raises potential Tenth Amendment concerns.
i. Erosion of Trust in Local Authorities
Members of various localitieS84 have been wary of Secure
Communities since its inception. Many localities, or its government
officials, argue that implementing the program would infringe on
state sovereignty because it may interfere with ongoing efforts to
build positive relationships with resident immigrants. In particular,
the National Immigration Forum stated that if immigrant
communities believe that local police are involved with ICE, it will
be risky for undocumented immigrants to call the authorities.85 This
would result in unreported crimes and unprotected victimS.86
San Francisco's Board of Supervisors voiced numerous concerns
regarding Secure Communities. In a proposed resolution, the Board
encourages local law enforcement to opt out of Secure Communities,
for several reasons. First, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors
recognized that Secure Communities could "compromise the safety
of local communities by eroding hard-earned trust built over the
past decades between community members and local law
enforcement by making individuals fearful of reporting crimes and
to [sic] cooperating with the police in solving crimes."8 7 San
Francisco leaders are concerned that undocumented and
documented immigrants will be less likely to report domestic
violence or other serious crimes due to fear of incriminating
themselves or their families in the process. 88
Moreover, San Francisco is a sanctuary city, which means it has
ordinances in place to protect local undocumented immigrants by
refusing to help enforce federal immigration law. In 1989, San
Francisco passed an ordinance which prohibits city employees from
assisting ICE with immigration investigations or arrests unless
required by federal or state law or a warrant.89 This ordinance was
passed in response to the Sanctuary Movement initiated by churches
84. San Francisco County, Santa Clara County, and Washington D.C. have been
among the strongest opponents to implementing Secure Communities. WASLIN, supra
note 46, at 11.
85. NATIONAL IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 5, at 2.

86. Id.
87. S.F. Cal. Bd. of Supervisors, Proposed Resolution, UNCOVER THE TRUTH 2 (2010),

http://uncoverthetruth.org/wp-content/uploads/Microsoft-Word-SecurecommunitiesBOS-Resolution-5-18-10-draft9.pdf.
88. Id.
89. S.F., Cal., Admin. Code chap. 12H, §§ 12H.1, 12H.2, 12H.2-1 (1989).
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throughout the U.S. that provided refuge to Central America
immigrants who were fleeing from civil wars and struggling to
obtain refugee status in the United States. 90 More recently, in
February 2007, Mayor Gavin Newsom issued an Executive Order
mandating that city departments develop training on the Sanctuary
Ordinance. 91 However, Secure Communities threatens to eviscerate
San Francisco's ordinance by causing the ordinance to lose its
practicability.
Although San Francisco County and Santa Clara County voiced
their desire to opt out of Secure Communities, former California
Attorney General and now present Governor, Jerry Brown, denied
San Francisco's request. 92 In fact, Governor Brown has refused to
allow any counties to opt out, stating that he wanted state-wide
uniformity. 93 However, we will not go into a detailed discussion of
the state versus local sovereignty issues reflected in this decision
because these are beyond the focus of this note.
Additionally, the District of Columbia also expressed similar
concerns with regard to Secure Communities. 94 ICE activated the
District of Columbia in November 2009, but on May 4, 2010, District
of Columbia Council members Phil Mendelson and Jim Graham
introduced a bill titled the "Secure Communities Bill of 2010."95 The
bill prohibited District of Columbia police from sharing information
with ICE through Secure Communities. 96 The bill was unanimously
supported by the Council, making the District of Columbia one of
the first jurisdictions to reject Secure Communities by local
legislation. 97 ICE has yet to release any information on whether it
plans to reactivate Secure Communities in the District of Columbia
or if, in general any jurisdiction that refuses to implement the
program will face any consequences.

90. Sanctuary Ordinance, CITY AND CNTY OF S.F., http://www.sfgsa.org/index.
aspx?page=1067 (last visited Aug. 19, 2011).
91. Id.
92. David Louie, SF Request to Opt Out of Secure Communities Denied, ABC 7 (May 25,
2010), http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/state&id=7461945.
93. Id.
94. Which States are Going to Great Lengths to NOT be Arizona?, RESTORE FAIRNESS,

http://restorefairness.org/tag/secure-communities-bill-of-2010/
2011).
95. Id.
96. Id.

97. Id.

(last visited Aug. 19,
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Lack Opt Out Option Implicates Tenth Amendment Concerns

The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution explicitly states
that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." 98 Each state has the power to
craft laws and enforce them within its own boundaries. 99 As set out
by the Supreme Court in two cases, New York v. United States and
Printz v. United States, the federal government cannot compel or
commandeer any state or local government to enforce or adopt
federal programs.10 0
At issue in New York, was whether Congress had the power to
compel States to provide for the disposal of radioactive waste
generated within their borders. Congress enacted the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (Radioactive
Waste Act) in anticipation of a shortage of radioactive waste disposal
sites.101 The Radioactive Waste Act contained three incentives for
the states to provide for the disposal of waste generated within their
borders: (1) monetary incentives, (2) access incentives, and (3) a take
title provision, requiring states to conform to federal regulations or
take title to low-level radioactive waste.102 The Court held that while
Congress could offer incentives to promote its programs and
encourage a state's cooperation, it would be unconstitutional for
Congress to commandeer or coerce the states into cooperation. 0 3
Specifically, the Court found that the take-title provision of the Act
was coercive and "inconsistent with the Constitution's division of
authority between federal and state governments."1o4
Despite finding the take-title provision unconstitutional, the
Court did emphasize that Congress could use many other means to
solicit state cooperation with federal programs. Congress can
directly regulate the states pursuant to the Commerce Clause or
preempt state law pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.1 05 Moreover,
Congress can also attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds to
influence a state's choices. 106
98. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
99. See id.; Jacobson vs. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25-28 (1905).
100. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
101. New York, 521 U.S. at 150-51.
102. Id. at 152-54.
103. Id. at 173-75.
104. Id. at 174-76.
105. Id. at 157-59.
106. Id. at 167 (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987)).
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The rationale behind the anti-commandeering rule set out in
New York is that if the federal government coerces states into
administering federal programs, "the accountability of both state
and federal officials is diminished." 0 7 Indeed, state officials may
"bear the brunt of public disapproval and the federal officials who
devised the regulatory program remain insulated from the electoral
ramifications of their decision." 0 8
The decision in New York was later reinforced by the Supreme
Court's decision in Printz. In Printz, Congress enacted the Brady
Act, which required the Attorney General to establish a system to
conduct background checks of anyone who tried to purchase a
handgun.109 However, Congress recognized that the Attorney
General would need time to create and implement the program so in
the meantime, the Brady Act also required state chief law
enforcement officers to conduct background checks of prospective
gun buyers." 0 Two state law enforcement officers challenged the
Brady Act, claiming it was unconstitutional because it forced them to
perform administrative functions for the federal government."' The
Court agreed and held that mandatory enforcement of the Brady Act
was unconstitutional because it infringed on state sovereignty
violating the Tenth Amendment.112
In Printz, the Court rejected the government's novel argument
but that argument is particularly relevant in the context of Secure
Communities. The government attempted to draw a distinction
between federal regulations that force states to create law and
The
regulations that force states to enforce federal law.1 3
Radioactive
the
from
Act
Brady
the
distinguish
to
government tried
Waste Act in New York by arguing that while the take-title provisions
in the Radioactive Waste Act forced states to enact policy, the Brady
Act merely commanded state and local officials to assist in
implementing federal law and was thus constitutional.114 Writing for
the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia expressly rejected the argument
stating, "[w]e fail to see how that improves rather than worsens the
intrusion upon state sovereignty."" 5 Justice Scalia reasoned that
there was no distinction between forcing states to enact legislation
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

New York, 521 U.S. at 168.
Id. at 168-69.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902 (1997).
Id. at 903.
Id. at 904.
Id. at 935.
Id. at 926-27.
Id.
Id. at 928.
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and coercing states into enforcing federal regulations.116
Here, the Secure Communities program is similar to the Brady
Act because the federal government is attempting to coerce a state 17
into enforcing a federal program. The reasoning in Printz applies to
Secure Communities, and the federal government should not be
allowed to encroach on state sovereignty by making decisions for the
alleged well-being of state citizens and its communities. ABC legal
analyst Dean Johnson agreed and stated that, "[a] federal program
cannot commandeer the resources of state and local government for
the administration of that program, and that's true even if the
resources that are taken from local and state officials are very small,
minimal and ephemeral. They just can't do it."118
Furthermore, since Secure Communities relies upon state and
local funding, these entities should be given greater leverage to
determine whether Secure Communities is an initiative they want to
adopt.
A major component of Secure Communities is the
detainment of potential deportees in law enforcement custody until
ICE can take federal custody. 119 While law enforcement officers
typically have the discretion to cite and then let arrestees go, in
Secure Communities jurisdictions once there is a hit in one of ICE's
databases, local law enforcement must detain the individual upon
ICE's request. The cost of this additional incarceration falls on the
local and state law enforcement. 120 Given the recent economic
downturns, major budget deficits, and limited resources, this is
another reason why ICE should give state and localities deference in
determining whether Secure Communities is right for their
community.
In keeping with the Supreme Court's decisions in both the New
York and Printz cases, state and local authorities seeking to opt out of
the Secure Communities program should be entitled to do so under
116. Printz, 521 U.S. 898 at 928.
117. While it is unclear what consequences may belie a state's decision to reject
Secure Communities, ICE has affirmatively stated that it plans for the program to be fully
implemented nationwide by 2013. See SECURE COMMUNITIES: ACfIVATED JURISDICTIONS,

supra note 52.
118. Louie, supra note 92.
119. See NATIONAL IMMIGRATION FORUM, BACKGROUNDER: QUICK INFORMATION ON

IMMIGRATION DETAINERS 1-2 (2010), available at http://www.immigrationforum.org/

images/uploads/2010/DetainersBackgrounder.pdf.
120. See e.g., April Castro, Perry Bills Feds $349 Million for Illegal Immigrants, THE
WASHINGTON TIMES (Aug. 27, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2011/aug/27/perry-bills-feds-349m-illegal-immigrants (discussing Texas Governor's
request for DHS to reimburse him $350 million to cover the costs that Texas incurred for
detaining undocumented immigrants in state prisons and county jails, as well as Arizona
Governor's suit to recover incarceration costs).
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the Tenth Amendment. The anti-commandeering doctrine is rooted
in the idea that states and local governments are in the best position
to gauge their community's needs and interests. Because states and
localities are more in tune with their community's best interest, their
decisions to opt in or opt out of Secure Communities should be
respected under the Constitution.
D. Potential for Civil Rights Violations
i. Racial Profiling
ICE claims that Secure Communities actually reduces the
possibility of racial or ethnic profiling because it relies on the
biometric information of all individuals who are arrested and have
However, this
their fingerprints run through the system.121
the actions and
account
into
to
take
fails
simplifies the problem and
While Secure
motivations of local law enforcement officers.
Communities may be a facially neutral policy that treats all arrestees
the same, a major problem with the program is that in activated
jurisdictions ICE lacks oversight in regards to how and why
individuals are arrested. Immigrant advocacy groups have voiced
valid concerns that local law enforcement officers with prejudices
toward people of color will find a pretext to arrest someone they
think looks undocumented, bring them to jail, and check their
fingerprints in anticipation of finding a match through ICE.12 2
There is insufficient data on areas where Secure Communities is
implemented, but allegations of racial profiling in CAP are
corroborated by a study conducted by U.C. Berkley Law School's
The Center for Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity,
and Diversity.123 The research focused largely on the CAP initiative,
but considering the critical similarities between the programs, it
provides probative evidence of how Secure Communities can also be
used as a tool for racial profiling.
The information and numbers in this study are gathered from
Irving, Texas, a city located in Dallas County.124 In 2006, of the
196,000 residents in Irving, 41.2% were Hispanic, 34.4% were
Caucasian, 12.2% were African-American, and 10.1% were Asian.125
121. Secure Communities: Quarterly Report - Fiscal Year 2010 Report to Congress
Fourth Quarter, supra note 79, at 33.
122. National Immigration Forum, supra note 5.
123. Gardner & Kohli, supra note 43, at 1.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 3.
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The study analyzed how local law enforcement and ICE were using
the CAP program.126 Researchers found evidence that through CAP,
ICE was "tacitly encourage[ing] local police to arrest Hispanics for
petty offenses."127 The report states that "these arrests represent one
part of an implicit, but relatively clear logic: the higher the number
of Hispanics arrests, the larger the pool of Hispanic detainees; the
larger the pool of detainees, the more illegal immigrants that can be
purged from the city via the CAP screening system." 28
The following findings particularly support the study's final
conclusions. First, between April 2008 and October 2008, the largest
spike of misdemeanor arrests and traffic violations involving
Hispanics occurred simultaneously with local law enforcement's
twenty-four seven access to ICE officials.129 Second, there existed a
strong correlation between the removal of procedural constraints on
local law enforcement and the high rates that Hispanics were being
arrested for minor infractions and petty crimes.130 This signified a
"fast-track" effort to allow and encourage local officers to increase
the number of Hispanic detainees to remove as many
undocumented immigrants as possible.131 Finally, the study shows
that since CAP's implementation in the area, only 2% of the total
amount of detainees consisted of those charged with serious crimes
and felonies.132
Unfortunately, this data provides compelling evidence that
racial profiling is used by some law enforcement officers and
agencies when implementing federal immigration programs. Secure
Communities, like CAP, gives local law enforcement the opportunity
to discriminate without providing oversight and disciplinary
procedures for possible civil rights violations.
ii. Due Process Violations
Under the Fifth Amendment, "no person shall be ... deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."133
Regardless of citizenship or immigration status, all persons are
guaranteed both procedural and substantive due process. Despite
the rights afforded by the Due Process Clause, many undocumented
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Gardner & Kohli, supra note 43, at 1.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5, 8.
Id. at 8.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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immigrants and immigrant rights advocates have reported due
process violations from unnecessary or prolonged detention under
Secure Communities.134

As previously mentioned, once there is a fingerprint match in
one of ICE's databases, ICE will evaluate the case and decide
whether or not to issue a detainer.s3 5 When ICE issues a detainer, it
is requesting that local authorities notify ICE prior to releasing the
individual in custody and to hold the individual up to forty-eight
hours (excluding weekends and holidays) past their scheduled time
of release to give ICE an opportunity to take the individual into
immigration custody. 136
However, many law enforcement agencies and prisons treat ICE
detainers not as a request but as a requirement to not release the
individual. 3 7 This can translate to significant due process violations;
for example, if an immigrant is arrested and issued a detainer but
charges are dropped or a court finds them not guilty, the immigrant
could still remain in law enforcement custody. 138 Finally, there are
reports that some immigrants have been detained for longer than the
forty-eight-hour allowance, regardless of whether they were found
guilty of the crime they were alleged to have committed.139

IV. Proposed Solutions
Secure Communities has significant legal and social
ramifications as an immigration enforcement initiative. There is
debate over whether these problems can be addressed by a few
simple yet significant changes or whether the program should be
abolished all together.
A. Allow Jurisdictions to Opt Out of Secure Communities
First, ICE should provide an opt out provision to eliminate
concerns of states and counties who do not wish to participate in
Secure Communities because they view the program as a threat to
public trust in law enforcement authorities. Moreover, if ICE
134. NATIONAL IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra.note 119.

135. WASLIN, supra note 46, at 12.

136. Id.
137. Id.

138. Id.
139. See NATIONAL IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 119, at 2-4 (discussing three

cases where the government has settled and ten pending cases in regards to illegal
detainers and due process violations).
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continues to mandate that Secure Communities be implemented in
all jurisdictions, Tenth Amendment concerns are implicated.
Indeed, sanctuary cities, or communities who do not believe the
benefits of Secure Communities outweigh the consequences, will
have their Tenth Amendment rights trampled.
ICE should revert to past policy. Just over a year ago, ICE
allowed jurisdictions unsure about implementing Secure
Communities to sit down with ICE officials and discuss the possible
benefits and consequence of executing Secure Communities in that
jurisdiction.14 0 This allowed for a mutually considered exchange and
ensured that all dissenting voices were heard. If after this process, a
county or state is still not convinced that Secure Communities is
right for their jurisdiction, they should be allowed to opt out in
accordance with the Tenth Amendment. Thus, providing an opt out
provision is one way in which ICE can eliminate the problem of a
Tenth Amendment violation.
B. Compile and Post Accurate and Detailed Data for Public
Access
ICE should routinely, as it has been doing after the FOIA
request, post documents to its website that allow public access to all
its data. ICE is required to submit quarterly reports to Congress,
and these mandatory reports should be posted on its website so the
public can see the actual numbers of matches, arrests, and removals.
Moreover, in response to allegations of civil rights violations,
ICE should compile further data on the ethnicity of those identified,
arrested, and removed.
ICE should also provide the ending
disposition for the underlying offenses. Collecting data on whether
deportees were ever convicted of the crimes for which police
arrested them would be practical research on whether ICE is acting
in accordance to Secure Communities' objectives. This will increase
transparency, while providing more information on the potential for
racial profiling.
C.

Send Fingerprints to ICE After Conviction

ICE's current policy is flawed, as law enforcement is obligated
to send fingerprints for ICE database identification upon arrest. The
problem with this procedure is that law enforcement officers can
make pre-textual arrests for minor crimes to usher in people of color
140. SECURE COMMUNITIES: SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT, supra note 81.
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who they suspect to be undocumented. Since there only needs to be
an arrest to run an individual's fingerprints, such officers have the
incentive to arrest as many suspected undocumented immigrants as
possible.
A more equitable process would be to have fingerprints sent to
ICE after the accused has been convicted. This compromise helps
ensure that ICE is at least partly meeting its policy goals of
identifying and removing convicted criminals from local
communities. The proposed process would also eradicate at least
some of the concerns surrounding racial profiling and civil rights
violations by allowing the prosecutor to review the charges. Law
enforcement officers may be less inclined to make pre-textual arrests
if they know that a prosecutor must assess the charges, bring
charges, then plea bargain or obtain a conviction before the
arrestee's fingerprints can be sent to ICE.
If ICE is unwilling to compromise and wait until after a
conviction to run fingerprints, a less ideal solution would be to have
jurisdictions submit fingerprints after an indictment. With an
indictment prosecutorial review still exists. However, preferably,
fingerprints should be submitted after a conviction, because this
helps to ensure that ICE is working toward meeting its stated
objectives and priorities of removing the most dangerous felons and
criminals first. At present, ICE is deporting low-level offenders and
noncriminal immigrants at a higher rate than Level 1 and Level 2
convicted criminals. In fact, noncriminal immigrants constitute
37,271 (or approximately 26%) of the 142,090 individuals being
deported under Secure Communities. 141 Having the safeguard of
prosecutorial review could serve as a deterrent to law enforcement
officers to make pre-textual arrests.
D. Institute More Stringent Requirements and Training Programs
To avoid due process and civil rights violations, ICE should
provide adequate education and training to police officers to ensure
that they understand exactly what a detainer is. At minimum, ICE
officials should clarify three things: (1) that a detainer is not a
mandate, but a request; (2) a detainer can only lawfully last fortyeight hours; and (3) distinguish immigration detainers from criminal
or other types of detainers. This way, there will be no confusion
over how many hours an individual can be detained and this will
141. SECURE COMMUNITIES: IDENT/IAFIS INTEROPERABILITY MONTHLY STATISTICS

THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30,2011, supra note 74, at 2.
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reduce prolonged detentions. Finally, ICE should provide training
programs narrowly tailored to educate law enforcement officers
about civil rights violations and racial profiling. ICE has recently
made several new changes to the Secure Communities program,
including collaborating with the DHS Office for Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties to develop a new training program that emphasizes
civil rights.142 This is an important step towards protecting
individual liberties and human rights.
E.

The Obama Administration's Newly Announced Immigration
Policy

On August 18, 2011, President Barack Obama's senior
administration officials announced a change in immigration
enforcement policies. 143 The administration would now require a
case-by-case review for all deportations and removals, focusing
particularly on prosecutorial discretion.144 Additionally, the Obama
Administration has promised to conduct a review of all pending
deportation and removal cases and close "low-priority cases, so
immigration courts can focus on the most serious ones."145 While
this commitment seems promising, a closer review shows that
significant positive change for victims of the improperly utilized
Secure Communities is unlikely.
First, the Obama Administration is merely reiterating what
ICE's purported objectives have always been: To identify,
apprehend, and remove the most dangerous undocumented
immigrants convicted of serious criminal offenses. This policy is, in
theory, no different than the policy ICE already follows. In practice
though, the administration's promise of reviewing individual cases
and closing deportation cases against low-priority immigrants has
the potential to create change. After all, this means that noncriminal
or Level 3 offenders currently ensnared in Secure Communities'
wide net could potentially have their cases dismissed, but under the
142. Secure Communities - What's New, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/securecommunities/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2011); see also Secure
Communities Briefings for Local and State Law Enforcement, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/secure-communities/crcl.htm (last visited Oct. 26,
2011).

143. Elise Foley, New Policy on DeportationsAllows Some Non-Criminal Undocumented
http://
POST
(Aug. 18,
2011),
Stay, THE
HUFFINGTON
Immigrants to
www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/18/officials-change-deportation-policyn_930688.
html#s332934&title=DREAMActStudents.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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administration's stated policy, current Level 2 or even Level 3
offenders would likely be unable to get relief.
This is because the Obama Administration's change in
enforcement policy seems to be a direct response to the DREAM
Act's failure to pass. 146 As evidenced by a memorandum from John
Morton, Director of ICE, some of the factors that ICE officers, agents,
and attorneys should consider include length of presence, military
service, family ties, ties to home country, age, family members with
status, criminal history, and "[ICE's] civil immigration enforcement
priorities." 14 7 "Positive factors" include veterans and members of
the military, long-time lawful permanent residents, minors,
individuals present in the U.S. since childhood, pregnant women,
victims of serious crimes, individuals with a serious mental or
physical disability or health condition. 148 "Negative factors" consist
of individuals who pose a risk to national security, serious
felons/repeat offenders/ individuals with a length criminal record,
known gang members, or individuals with an "egregious record of
immigration violations." 1 4 9
The overwhelming majority of relevant factors are directly
related to the problems the DREAM Act was meant to address; the
deportation of nondangerous undocumented immigrants who were
brought into the U.S. at an early age, with little to no ties to their
home countries, and who are actively pursuing an education or
willing to enlist in military service. Therefore, it appears that the
Obama Administration's new enforcement policy will primarily
It
affect, and possibly benefit, only noncriminal immigrants.
remains to be seen what effect this policy will have for Level 3
offenders who are only convicted of petty offenses.

Conclusion
Secure Communities dictates that all activated jurisdictions
must submit and run fingerprint biometrics through ICE's database.
While the purpose of the program is to identify and remove
dangerous criminals from local communities, the data shows that
ICE does not seem to be removing individuals based on its own
146. Foley, supra note 143.
147. Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec'y, U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, to All Field Office Directors, Special Agents in Charge, and Chief Counsel 4
(June 17, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/securecommunities/pdf/
prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf
148. Id. at 5.
149. Id.
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Since its inception, more than 56% of
identified priorities.
individuals removed under Secure Communities were identified as
noncriminals or Level 3 offenders who had committed only petty
offenses.
Furthermore, there are allegations of civil rights and due
process violations. Immigrant rights advocacy groups are extremely
concerned with the potential for police abuse in their discretionary
power and power of detainers. Finally, ICE seems to maintain that
there is no opt out procedure for Secure Communities, and many
jurisdictions are being activated despite worries among community
members. This implicates the a potential Tenth Amendment's anticommandeering clause violation because Secure Communities seems
to force states to enforce federal regulations.
In order to resolve these problems, ICE should either abolish the
program or temporarily halt the program until it can implement
effective solutions. First, ICE should allow jurisdictions to opt out of
Secure Communities. Second, ICE should collect data on the ethnic
background of those who are arrested and assemble data on the final
disposition of the individual's case. This data should be made
available to the public to increase transparency while making sure
Third, law
officers are not participating in racial profiling.
ICE
until after
to
fingerprints
enforcement officers should not send
the individual has been convicted. This ensures that ICE is meeting
its purported priority that the most dangerous convicted felons are
removed. Finally, ICE must institute more stringent requirements
and also provide education and training to law enforcement on civil
rights violations, dangers of racial profiling, and the truth about
immigration detainers.
Secure Communities has the potential to be a fair and effective
program, but currently it targets minority communities and there are
too many loopholes for the program to succeed to be a long-term
plan for immigration enforcement in the future. President Obama's
announced immigration policy with regard to case-by-case review of
deportation cases could eradicate some of the concerns implicated
by Secure Communities, but the impact of this policy remains to be
seen.

